Supreme Court of Pennsyllvaniza.
PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. v. WEILLER.
A stipulation in a bill'oflading that an agreed valuation shall cover loss
or damage from any cause whatever, does not relieve the carrier from liability for the actual value of goods lost, when the loss has been caused by
his own negligence.
But in such case the owner of the goods which have been lost through
the negligence of the carrier, may recover from him their full actual
value, notwithstanding the fact that a less value was agreed upon and that
in consideration of such agreement a lower rate of freight was charged.
tTcmfLL,, J., dissents.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas No. i, of Philadelphia County.
Trespass, by Hermann Weiller against the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company to recover damages for the loss of four
barrels of whiskey, ca.used by the alleged negligence of
defendant. Plea, not guilty.
Upon the trial, before BRiGY, J., it appeared that on June
15, 1887, the defendant received from Moore & Sinnott, at
Belle Vernon, ten barrels of whiskey, to be carried over the
line of its road to Philadelphia, and delivered to Hermann
Weiller, the plaintiff, the owner and consignee thereof.
While the shipment was in the possession of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, four barrels of the whiskey were lost or
destroyed by a wreck occurring on defendant's railway. The
whiskey was shipped under a bill of lading, of which the
material clauses were as follows -Received, June 15, 1887, from Moore & Sinnott, the following described
property, in apparent good order (contents, and condition of contents, of
packages unknown), to be transported to and delivered at the regular
freight station of the company at Philadelphia, Pa., subject to all the conditionsfollowing and npon the back of this receilt, and to be delivered in
like good order, subject to the said conditions, upon payment of freight
and advanced charges, and upon payment also of all charges accruing
under the said conditions.
It is initdally agreed, and it is the spirit of this contract, wthat the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, hereinafter designated the carrier, shall
transport the above-named merchandise with all due care and dispatch to

PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. V. WEILLER.

767

its destination, or to the terminus of its line in the direction of destination, and tender it to the consignee, or to the connecting carrier, as the
case may be, in the same apparent good order and condition in which it
was receipted for at point of shipment, and in case of loss from any
cause within the carrier's reasonable control, shall pay for the same at the
net invoice price, freight charges added if paid (unless a lower value of
the articles has been agreed upon with the shippers, and such value noted
hereon, or same is determined by the classification upon which the rates
are based), and in case of damage through the negligence of the carrier's
servants, shall pay ajust assessment of same, the carrier to have the full
benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon or on account
of said goods.
The carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage by causes beyond its
reasonable control, by fire from any cause and wheresoever occurring; by
riots, strikes, or stoppages of labor, or by any of the causes incident to
transportation, such as chafing, heating, freezing, leakage, rust or any
otherreason not directly traceable to the negligence of the carrier's servants.
. .
And, finally, in accepting this shipping receipt, the shipper, owner and
consignee of the goods, and the holder of the shippingreceipt, agree to be
bound by all its stipulations, exceptions, and conditions, whether written
or printed, as fully as if they were all signed by such a shipper, owner,
consignee or holder.
When a valuation as agreed upon shall be named upon this shipping
receipt, it is distinctly understood that such valuation shall cover loss or
damage from any cause whalever.

By a provision of the bill of lading the whiskey was
valued at twenty dollars per barrel. The evidence showed
that this provision was inserted by the shippers, and there
was no question if the case as to their knowledge of the contents and terms of the bill of lading; that there -were two
rates of freight fixed by the company for the carriage of
freight of this character, to wit, thirty-three cents per hundred pounds, and twenty-eight cents per hundred pounds, and
that the lower rate was given to shippers at their own request, upon their entering into a contract, which was written
into the bill of lading, that in case of any loss or damage no
greater sum should be recovered than the valuation fixed
therein, being in this instance a lower valuation than the
actual value of the whiskey. The defendant offered to pay
the plaintiff for the barrels of whiskey destroyed at the valuation fiked in the bill of lading, to wit, twenty dollars per
barrel. The plaintiff refused this offer.
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Defendant requested the Court to charge(1) A common carrier is entitled by agreement with the shipper, and
in consideration of an undertaking to transport merchandise at a low rate
of freight, to limit its liability by fixing a value upon the merchandise,
beyond which it cannot be held responsible. This having been done in
the present case, there can be norecoverybeyond the value of the whiskey
fixed in the bill of lading, to wit, twenty dollars per barrel.
Refused.
(2) Under all the evidence in this case there can be no recovery by the
plaintiff beyond the amount of twenty dollars per barrel for the barrels
of whiskey not delivered, with interest upon that amount from the date
when the delivery should have taken place.

Refused.
The Court charged the jury as follows
"Under my view of this evidence and the papers in the case, I instruct
you to find for the plaintiff for the value of the whiskey less the freight;
that is $257.27 less $I.77, with interest thereon."

Verdict accordingly and judgment thereon. Defendant
then took this writ, assigning for error the charge of the
Court and the refusal of its points.
George Tucker Bisfiham, for plaintiff in error.
Edward H. W4ei, for defendant in error.
GREEN, J., April 21, 1890. In the case of Elki zs v. Emfiire Transfiorlation Co. (1876), *81 Pa. 315, no question of
negligence, or of the carrier's right to limit his liability for
his acts of negligence, was raised, discussed, or decided either
in the Court below or in this Court. The reporter says the
cause of action set out in the declaration was the loss of certain high wines delivered to defendant, but lost by negligence. This is the only reference to the subject of negligence to be found in the entire report of the case. The record shows that the case was not tried upon any theory of
negligence, but exclusively upon the terms, and interpretation of the contract as contained in the bill of lading. No,
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question was made upon the subject of the right of the carrier to limit his liabilit3 for the loss occurring by his own
negligence, and we are bound to assume that the facts of the
case did not give rise to such a question. Nothing was said
upon that subject either in the argument of counsel, or in
the charge of the Court below, or in the opinion of this
Court. It was for this reason that no reference was made to
this case in the opinion of this Court in the case of Grogan
& Mferz v. Adams Express Co. (1886), 1i4 Pa. 523. The
same reason is applicable now. It may be that the accident
in the Elkins case was not the result of any negligence of
the carrier. Judging from the names of the counsel concerned, it is almost certain that if the facts had developed a
case of negligence, and the question of the right of the carrier to limit his liability for acts of negligence, that question
would have been promptly raised, discussed *anddecided.
In the present case the question does arise under the conditions annexed to the bill of lading. Many enumerated
causes of loss are expressly excepted, such as fire, riots,
strikes, heating, freezing, leakage, rust, etc., and as to these the
right of the company to limit its liability must be affirmed
in accordance with numerous decisions of this and other
Courts. But the final clause of the conditions stipulates that,
"When a valuation as agreed upon shall be named upon this
shipping receipt, it is distinctly understood that such valuation shall cover loss or damage from any cause whatever."
As this necessarily includes loss arising from negligence, and
as the testimony tended to establish a loss by negligence, the
question of the efficacy of the clause under consideration to
relieve the company from liability for negligence beyond the
agreed value, necessarily arises. Upon that subject we have
so recently expressed ourselves in the case of Grogan &
Merz v. Adams Exfress Co., sufra, that we think it unnecessary to repeat either the text or substance of the opinion
there announced.
So far as the question at issue is concerned, we can see no difference between that case and
this.
VOL. XXXVIII.-49.
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Judgment affirmed.
MITCHELL, J., (dissenting.) To allow a shipper to value
his goods for purposes of freight charges, etc., at one price,
and then when they are lost, to recover, as in this case, three
times his own agreed value, is a direct premium on fraud
such as no Court. ought to sanction. The public policy
which prohibits a common carrier from contracting against
the negligence of his employes, or, expressing the rule in
commercial language, which prohibits a shipper from becoming his own insurer against accidental loss, if he so chooses,
by paying a lower rate of freight, was founded upon a condition of things which has passed away, and the rule itself
should, in my opinion, be materially modified, if not
abrogated altogether in regard to goods. That, however, is
an alteration of the law which is legislative in its scope and
-cannot be properly made by the Courts. I am, therefore, in
:favor of adhering to the rule as far as it has been settled by
the decisions, but would not extend it in the slightest de:gree. In this case the public were offered two plans: a full
liability at a regilar rate, or a stipulated maximum liability
at a reduced rate. The plaintiff, with full knowledge, chose
the latter. Upon the reasonableness of such a regulation,
the argument of Lord BLAcl.BuRl, in Manchester S. & L.
BRy. Co. v. Brown (1883), L. R. 8 App. Cases, 703, 712, is
in my judgment unanswerable. "When there has been a
fixed rate, if it be shown in point of fact that although people
can have their goods reasonably carried at that rate, they do
enter into agreements of this sort to have them carried at
another rate, that is extremely strong evidence that the
agreement is reasonable." Instead of "extremely strong," I
should say conclusive. The observations of Lord BRAMiWELL, in the same case, are also worthy of careful reading.
Because I believe this case to be a step beyond the pre-

vious decisions on the subject, I am compelled to dissent from
this judgment.
STEmRITT and W uImIA s, JJ., absent.
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The doctrine which is followed
by the majority of the Court in
this case, is in consonance with a
line of Pennsylvania decisions, beginning with Farnham v. Camden
&_f
Amboy RR. Co. (1867), 55 Pa.
53- In that case the plaintiffs had
shipped from Philadelphia for New
York certain bales of goods. Subject to a condition in the bill of
lading that "the responsibility of
the company as carriers of the
within named goods is hereby
limited so as not to exceed $ioo
for every ioo lbs. weight thereof,
and at that rate for a greater or less
quantity, the shipper declining td
pay for any higher risk." The
goods were carried in safety to
New York and deposited under a
shed upon the wharf of the railroad
company, where they were destroyed by fire, the company, however,
being chargeable with no negligence. The Court held that by the
special contract limiting the liability of the carrier, its liability ceased to be that of an insurer and became that of a bailee for hire. "It
does not admit of a doubt," said
THo &so, J., "that a common
carrier may by a special contract,
and perhaps by notice, limit his
liability for loss or injury to goods
carried by him, as to every caise of
injury, excepting that arising from
his own or the negligence of his
servants. A great variety of cases
cited in the very able argument of
the learned counsel for the defendants [JAM.FS E. GOWEN and ASA
I. nIsH, one of the original editors
of the AMERICA.N LAW ReGISTIR]
established this as the rule in England, from Southcote's .Case, 4
Coke's Rep. 84, A. D. i6oi, idown
to The Peninsular and Oriental
Steam Navigation Co. v. The
Hon. FarquharShand, ii Jurist,

CO

V. WEILLER.

771, in 1865. The same rule generally holds in the several States
in this country, as will appear in
Story on Bailments, 549, notes a and
b; Dov v. New JerseySteam Vavigation Co. (1854), I Kern (N. Y.)
484; and in the Supreme Court of the
United States in York Co. v. The
Central RR. Co. (i866), 3 Wall.
(70 U. S.) 107. This haslongbeen
the rule in this State, as is shown
by Bingham v. Rogers (;843), 6 W.
and S. (Pa.) 495 ; Laing v. Colder
(1848), 8 Pa. 479; Camden &
Am boy RR. Co, v. Baldauf(I85i),
16 Id. 67; Chouteaux v. Leech
(1852), iS Id. 224; Goldey v. Pennsylvania RR. Co. (1858), 3oId.242;
and PennsylvaniaRR. Co. v. Hen'
But,
derson (i865), 51 Pa. 315.
he adds, "the doctrine is firmly
settled that a common carrier cannot limit his liability so as to cover
his own or his servants' negligence,
nor do I suppose this possible o~f
any bailee."
The next case was American
Express Co. v. Sands (1867),.55 Pa.
14o, decided at the same term of
Court. Sands had shipped a barrel-saw by the Express Company
from Pittsburgh to Irvine, Warren
Co., Pa. When delivered, the saw
was cracked and useless, and was
Sands
therefore not accepted.
brought suit against the company,
claiming as damages the full value
of the saw and obtained a verdict
for $475, upon which the Court
entered judgment, notwithstanding
the fact that the bill of lading had
contained a stipulation that the Express Company was not to be held
liable "for any loss or damage of
any box, package or thing for over
$5o, unless the just and true value
thereof is herein stated," there being no other statement of the value
of the article shipped. Judge
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(afterwards Chief Justice) THOMPSON, again delivered the opinion
of the Court, which was as follows:
"The principles involved in this
case were all discussed in an opinion delivered at this term, Farnham v. Camden & Amboy RR.
Co., sipra. It was there held that
the company might limit the extent of liability in case of loss or
injury, by a special contract or
special acceptance of the goods to
be carried, and thus become subject
to the laws of bailment only; but
that there could be no limitation
of liability where the loss or injury
resulted from the negligence of the
Was
company or its servants.
there negligence in the case before
us? There are numerous authorities cited in the case referred to, to
show that when goods are lost or
damaged while in the custody of
the carrier under a special contract,
and he gives no account of how it
occurred, a presumption of negligence will follow of course. That
is just the case before us, and hence
it was right to hold the company
liable to the extent of the full value
of the saw."
The authority chiefly relied on
by the majority of the Court in the
principal case, is Groganv. Adams
Express Co. (1886), 114 Pa. 523.
In that case the plaintiffs had shipped by. the express company a
package containingjewelry, valued
at $198. The shipping receipt
contained the following clause:
" Nor in any event shall the holder
hereof demand payment beyond
the sum of fifty dollars, at which
the article forwarded is hereby
valued, unless otherwise herein expressed, or unless specially insured
by them and so specified in this receipt." The Court below instructed the jury that this clause was a

valuation and a binding contract,
"a determination on the part of
these parties as to the value of that
package, and governs this transaction, unless the company took and
appropriated it to its own use when
it would have to pay the whole of
it." In this instruction the Court
expressly followed Hart v. Pennsylvania RR.Co. (1884), 112 U. S.
331, a case which will be discussed
later in this annotation. In reversing the lower Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (GnEEN,
1.), after commenting upon the
three cases already cited, go on to
say: "Howis it in the case at
bar? We think that it must be
conceded that by the terms of the
express receipt, signed by the company's agent, and delivered to, and
accepted by the plaintiffs, the
article shipped was valued at fifty
dollars, and the company limited
its liability to that sum, and this
limitation would be a protection
liability beyond that
against
amount, except for negligence. It
is a contract almost precisely similar to the one upon which we passed, in the case of the American.
Express Co. v. Sands, supra, but
is stronger than that in favor of the
carrier, because it contains an express agreement that the article
forwarded was valued at fifty dollars, which the receipt in the Sands
case did not. But the Express
Company in the present case failed
to account for the non-delivery of
the article, and hence a presumption of negligence arose, which
they should have rebutted in order
to escape liability, but they did not
doso. * * * The learned Court
further charged the jury that the
defendant could limit its own liability, even as against its own negligence, and had done so by the re-
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ceipt given to the plaintiffs when
the goods were shipped. This was
done in obedience to a decision of
the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Hartv. Pennsylvania RR. Co., supra. An* examination of that case shows that
such is the law as declared by that
Court, and if the decision were of
binding authority upon us, we
-would be obliged to follow it. But
our own decisions for a long time
have established the opposite doctrine, until it has become firmly
fixed in our system of jurisprudence. We could not depart from
it now without overruling them all,
and we are not willing to do so.
'The authorities upon the general
subject are very numerous and con"flicting. But with us the rule has
been uniform and we prefer to ad'here to it."
Prior to Grogan v. Adams .Ex.press Co., the case of Elkins v.
Empire TransportationCo. (1876),
Si *Pa. 315, had come before the
same Court. This was an action
for the value of fifty barrels of high
wines, which had been shipped
under a bill of lading containing a
stipulation that the amount of loss
,or damage should "be computed
at the value or cost of said goods or
property at the place and time of
shipment." The rate of freight,
4150
cents per ioo pounds," and
the words "Valuation $20 per barrel" were written in the blanks of
the printed bill of lading. The report of the case shows that a portion of the goods were lost by an
accident on the railroad, which
does not seem to have been explained by the Transportation Company, so as to relieve it from the
presumption of negligence, which
was alleged in the declaration.
The Court below charged that "if
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there was no contract limiting the
responsibility, they (the carriers)
are responsible for the whole loss ;
but if there was a contract, either
express or implied, that they were
not to be held liable beyond$20 per
barrel, they are not liable beyond
that." This instruction -was assigned as error, but the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment, saying: "The valuation of $2o per
barrel, written into the blank of
the printed bill of lading, together
with the stipulated freight at fifty
cents per one hundred pounds, are
controlling parts of the bill of lading, and not controlled by the
printed stipulation that the amount
of the loss or damage accruing and
falling on the carriers shall be computed at the value or cost of the
goods at the place and time ofshipment. These parts, written into
the printed bill, express the true
contract of the parties, and the $2o
per barrel must, therefore, be regarded as the value or cost, fixed
by the parties in advance, as that
to be treated as such, as of the time
and place of shipment. This accords with the evidence that such
freight, if left to be determined in
value at the place and time of shipment, would not be carried at less
than $i.6o per one hundred pounds.
There was ample consideration,
therefore, for the low valuation in
this diminution of the freight as
stipulated at fifty cents." This decision is apparently in conflict with
the other Pennsylvania cases, but
is distinguished in the majority
opinion in the principal case.
In Pennsylvania RR. Co. v.
Raiordon (1888), 119 Pa. 577, a
still later case than those cited by
the majority of the Court, it was
said in an opinion by W:r IAxasJ.:
"It is too late to deny that in
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Pennsylvania a common carrier
may limit his liability by a special
contract. In lttwood v. Reliance
TransportationCo. (1839), 9 Watts
(Pa.) 87, GIBSON, C. J., recognized
the rule as well established, although expressing grave doubts of
its wisdom. In Laing v. Colder
(1848), 8 Pa. 479, this Court again
gave its assent to the rule, while
BELL, J., by whom the opinion was
delivered, expressed his sympathy
with the doubt of Chief Justice
GIBSON. The same rule has been
held in many later cases, among
which are Powell v. Pennsylvania
RR. Co. (1859), 32 Pa. 414 ; American Express Co. v. Sands (1867),
55 Id. 14o; Pennsylvania RR. Co.
v. Miller (1878), 87 Id. 395 ; Adams
Express Co. v. Sharpless (1876),
77 Id. 517; Clydev. Hubbard(1879),
88 Id. 358. It is equally well setfled that such limitation does not
relieve the carrier from liability for
his own negligence: Pennsylvania
RR. Co. v. Miller, supra. The
reason for this qualification of the
power to limit liability rests on
public policy."
The contrary doctrine to that of
the Pennsylvania cases is broadly
stated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Hart v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (1884), 112 U. S.
331. It is there said by Justice
BLATCHvORD: " It is the law of this
Court, that a common carrier may,
by special contract, limit his common law liability; but that he cannot stipulate for exemption from
the consequences of his own negligence or that of his servants: New
Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank (1848), 6 How. (47 U.
S.) 344; York Co. v. CentralR. R.
Co. (1866), 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 107 ;
The New York CentralR. R. Co. v.
Lockwood (1873), 17 Id. (84 U. S.)
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357 ; The Southern.Express Co. v.
Caldwell (1875), 21 Id. (88 U. S.)
264 ; The Ogdensburg, etc. R. R.
Co. v.Pratt (1875), 22 Id. (89 U. S.)
123;* Bank of Kentucky v. AdamsExpress Co. (1876), 93 U. S. 174;
The Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.
Stevens(I878),95 Id.655. * * *
To the views announced in these
cases we adhere. But there is not
in them any adjudication on the
particular question now before us.
It may, however, be disposed of
on principles which are well established and which do not conflict
with any of the rulings of this
Court. As a general rule, and in
the absence of fraud or imposition,
a common carrier is answerable for
the loss of a package of goods
though he is ignorant of its con-"
tents, and though its contents are
ever so valuable, if he does not
make a special acceptance. This is
reasonable, because he can always
guard himself by a special acceptance, or by insisting on being informed of the nature and value of
the articles before receiving them.
If the shipper is guilty of fraud or
imposition, by misrepresenting the
nature or value of the articles, he
destroys his claim to indemnity,
because he has attempted to deprive
the carrier of the right to be compensated in proportion to the value
of the articles and the consequent
risk assumed, and what he has done
has tended to lessen the vigilance
the carrier would otherwise have
bestowed: 2 Kent's Comm. 603,
and cases cited; Relfv. Rapip (1841),
3 XV. & S. (Pa.) 21 ; Dunlap v. International Steamboat Co. (1867),
98 Mass. 371 ; The N. Y. Cent. and
Hudson River R. R. Co. v. Fralof(1879), ioo U. S. 24. This qualification of the liability of the carrier
is reasonable, and is as important
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as the rule which it qualifies. There
is no justice in allowing the shipper
to be paid a large value for an article
which he has induced the carrier to
take at a low rate of freight on the
assertion and agreement that its
value is aless sum than that claimed
after a loss. It is just to hold the
shipper to his agreement, fairly
made, as to value, even where the
loss or injury has occurred through
the negligence of the carrier. The
effect of the agreement is to cheapen
the freight and secure the carriage,
if there is no loss ; and the effect of
disregarding the agreement, after a
loss, is to expose the carrier to a
greater risk than the parties intended he should assume. The
agreement as to value, in this case,
stands as if the carrier had asked
the value of the horses [the
subject matter of the contract
and had
there in question],
been told by the plaintiff the sum
inserted in the contract. The limitation as to value has no tendency
to exempt from liability for negligence. It does not induce want of
care. It exacts from the carrier the
measure of care due to the value
agreed on. The carrier is bound to
respond in that value for negligence.
The compensation for carriage is
based on that value. The shipper
is estopped from saying that the
value is greater. The articles have
no greater value, for the purposes
of the contract of transportation,
between the parties to thatcontract.
The carrier must respond for negligence up to that value. It is just
and reasonable that such a contract,
fairly entered into, and where there
is no deceit practised on the shipper, should be upheld. There is no
violation of public policy. On the
contrary, it would be unjust and
unreasonable, and would be repug-

CO. V. WEILLER.

775

nant to the soundest principles of
fair dealing and of the freedom of
contracting, and thus in conflict
with public policy, if a shipper
should be allowed to reap the benefit of the contract if there is no loss,
and to repudiate it in case of loss.
* * * The distinct groundof our
decision in the case at bar is, that
where a contract of the kind, signed
by the shipper, is fairly made,
agreeing on the valuation of the
property carried, with the rate of
freight based on the condition that
the carrier assumes liability only to,
the extent of the agreed valuation,
even in case of loss or damage by
the negligence of the carrier, the
contract will be upheld as a proper
and lawful mode of securing a due
proportion between the amount for
which the carrier may be. responsible and the freight he receives,
and of protecting himself against
extravagant and fanciful valuations."
In the opinion quoted, the fact is
recognized that the decisions in
this country on the question there
It
discussed, are at variance.
therefore becomes necessary, to a
full comprehension of the present
status of the law of the United
States upon this subject, to make a.
careful examination of the rulings
of the Courts of last resbrt in the
various States.
In Alabama, the earlier decisions
are in accord with the Pennsylvania rule, but of late the tendency
has been in the contrary direction.
Thus in the earliest case upon the
subject, ilIobile & 0. R. R. Co. v.
Hofikins (i86S), 41 Ala. 486, the
Court held thata limitation of value
"may be made by special contract,
but that a common carrier cannot
exempt himself, by any such contract, from liability for the negli-

PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD

gence, willful default, or tort, of
-himself or his servants; and this
upon the familiar principle, that
whatever has an obvious tendency
to encourage guilty negligence,
fraud or crime, is contrary to public
policy,"-citing Camden & A. R.
R. Co. v..Baldaiuf (185i), 16 Pa. 67To the same effect is the doctrine
enunciated in South & North_Ala.
.R. R. Co. v. Henlein (1875), 52
Ala. 6o6, and Same v. Same (1876),
56 Id. 368, although in these cases
the Court assumed the right to
judge whether the limitation was
justand reasonable, and proportionate "to the real value of the animal
[the subject-matter of the contract
was a mule] and the amount of
freight received." In Ala. Great
Soutlhern R. R. Co. v Little (1882),
71 Ala. 61r, the law is very positively stated to be that "for the
want of ordinary care, skill and
diligence, from whichaloss results,
the carrier is liable for the value of
the goods, as would be any other
paid bailee or agent, and for exemption from this liability he has
not stipulated, and the law will not
tolerate that he should stipulate."
This case is followed in Louisville
6 N. R. R. Co. v Oden (I885), 8o
Ala. 38, but the latest case, Louisville 6 N. R. R. Co. v. Sherrod
(887), 84 Id. 178, appears to adopt
the views of the United States
Supreme Court. While this case
attempts to distinguish the earlier
Alabama decisions, its practical
effect is to overrule them. It is
there said by CLoP'ToN, J. : "Limitations as to value do not come
under the operation of the rule,
that a carrier cannot, by special
contract, exempt himself from liability for the consequences of his
own negligences, and ordinarily are
not calculated to induce negligence.
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To the amount of the agreed valuation the carrier is responsible for
loss occasioned by his neglect, or
by any of the risks or accidents for
which he isanswerable. No public
good will be subserved by denying
to the parties the right to make
such contracts. The shipper and
the carrier may lawfully contract
as to the valuation of the articles
to be transported. Such special
contract is in the nature of an
agreement to liquidate the damages,
proportionately to the compensation
received for the carriage, and the
responsibility of safely carrying and
delivering. * * * When the
value has been thus fairly agreed on,
the carrier cannot recover a greater
rate, and the shipper should not be
allowed to take benefit of the reduced rate, if there is no loss, and
to repudiate the contract, if there
is a loss." The Court, however,
states as a qualification of the rule,
that "such special contracts may
be avoided by wilful or wanton
negligence in disregard of the rights
of the shipper." Under this case,
the Alabama rule must be held to
sustain limitations of value by
special contract, even where the
loss is occasioned by negligence,
provided it is not wilful or wanton.
In Arhansas, the rule of Hartv.
Pa. RR. Co. has been expressly
adopted and followed: St. Louis,
I. A. 6 S. Ry. Co. v. Lesser (1885),
46 Ark. 236; St. Louis, I.. -' & S.
Ry. Co. v. Weakly (1887), 50 Id.
397- In the latter case the Court
say: "As a general rule, the common carrier is bound to receive and
carry that which is offered to him
for transportation. He ought to be
entitled to a reasonable reward for
his services. As the risk of conveying property of confiderable
value is greater than that of small
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value, the care required is, and the
reward should be, greater. It is,
therefore, reasonable and right that
the value of the property shipped
should be ascertained in order that
the carrier may know the extent of
his responsibility and the care and
attention required, and fix the
amount of his reward. * * * If,
therefore, the measure of the liability of the carrier as agreed upon
is adjusted by the reward to be received by the carrier under his contract, and the contract of shipment
is fairly entered into, and no deceit
is practised upon the shipper, the
contract is reasonable as to the
measure of liability and should be
upheld." In both of these cases
negligence was alleged.
LIn California, the question
would seem to be governed by the
Civil Code of that State, which provides: "Snc. 2174, The obligation
of a common carrier cannot be
limited by general notice on his
part, but may be limited by special
-contract.
"SEc. 2175, A common carrier
-cannot be exonerated by any agreenent made in anticipation thereof,
from liability for the gross negligence, fraud or willful wrong of
himselfor his servants.
6
"SEC.217 , A passenger,consignor
,or consignee, by accepting a ticket,
bill of lading, or written contract for
carriage, with a knowledge of its
terms, assents to the rate of hire,
the time, place and manner of delivery therein stated, and also to
the limitation stated therein upon
the amount of the carrier's liability
in case property carried in packages,
trunks, or boxes is lost or injured,
-when the value of such property is
not named; and also to the limitation stated therein to the carrier's

liability for loss or injury to live
animals carried. But his assent to
any other modification of the carrier's obligations contained in such
instrument, can be manifested only
by his signature to the same." And
it is further provided by"SEc. 22o, A common carrier of
gold, silver, platina, or precious
,stones, or of imitations thereof, in
a manfactured or unmanufactured
state; of timepieces of any description ; of negotiable paper or other
valuable writings ; of pictures, glass,
or china ware; of statuary, silk, or
laces ; or of plated ware of any kind,
is not liable for more than fifty dollars upon the loss or injury of any
one package of such articles, unless
he has notice, upon his receipt
thereof, by mark upon the package
or otherwise, of the nature of the
freight; nor is such carrier liable
upon any package carried for more
than the value of the articles named
in the receipt or the bill of lading."
The recent case of Scamnmon v.
Wells, Fargoand Co. (1890), 84 Cal.
311, was decided under this last
section, the Court saying, "this
measure of damages was adopted
for the protection of the carrier, and
does no injustice to the owner."
[In Orms6y v. U. P. Ry. Co.
(i88o), U. S. C. Ct., D. Colorado, 2
McCrary 48, there was a printed
statement appended to the contract, headed "Rules and regulations for the transportation of live
stock," which contained a schedule
of amounts for which the company would be liable in case of
damage or injury to such live stock,
but such statement was not signed
by the plaintiff or his agent. The
Court therefore charged the jury
that the statement was "not in the
contract, *' * * that the shipper is only bound by the stipula-

I
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admitted that no notice was given
lions contained in the contract itself," and that such "rules and
of the value of the packages beregulations for the transportation
yond two hundred dollars. We
of live stock, printed at the head of think, therefore, that the most the
this contract, * * are notapart plaintiffs should have been permitted to recover is two hundred
of the contract with this plaintiff."
In OverlandMail 6' Express Co. dollars for each package, instead
of the full value of the packages."
v. Carroll (1883), 7 Colo. 43, the
Court said: "Appellant [the Com- The case of Welch, v. The Boston
pany] could not make a binding
&' Albany RR. Co. (1874), 44
contract with the owner, whereby
Conn. 333, supports the rule that if
it should be released from all lia- a special contract relieves from all
bility in case of loss through negli- liability, it is void. If it limits responsibility to the exercise of ordigence. Upon the same principle,
it could not make a.binding connary care, * * the company
tract with him limiting its liability
have the benefit of their contract.
for loss occasioned by its negli[In Dakota, the question is govgence to fifty dollars, or to any
erned by the Civil Code, which proother sum short of the actual value
vides, " 1261, The obligations of
of the goods shipped, provided of
a common carrier-cannot be limited
course, that it had notice of such
by general notice on his part, but
actual value when it received
may be limited by special contract.
them."
"
1262, A common carrier cannot be exonerated by any agree[In Lawrence and others v. The
ment, made in anticipation thereof,
New York, Providence 6 Boston
RR. Co. (1869), 36 Conn. 63, there from liability for the gross negligence, fraud, or willful wrong of
was a clause in the bill of lading
"that no responsibility will be ad- himself or his servants.
1263, A passenger, consignor,
"
mitted under any circumstances to
or consignee, by accepting a ticket,
a greater amount upon any article
bill of lading, or written contract
of freight than two hundred dollars,
for carriage, with a knowledge of
unless upon notice given of euch
its terms, assents to the rate of
amount, and a special agreement
therefor." The Court below charg- hire, the time, place and manner
of delivery therein stated. But his
ed the jury that the plaintiffs were
assent to the other modifications of
entitled to the full value of the
the carrier's rights or obligations
goods lost, but the appellate Court
contained in such instrument can
said, " This was clearly wrong.
There was no claim or pretense of only be manifested by his signature
to the same." The case of Hartany gross negligence on the part of
the defendants. They stored the well v. N. P. E. Co. (1889), 5 Dak.
goods in their depot, because the 463, was decided under these sections. There, the defendants sought
boat that evening was so full that
that it could not take them. They
to free themselves from liability on
had therefore to lie over for the the ground that there was a special
contract limiting the amount to be
boat of the following day; and in
claimed, and the time within
the meantime, they were destroyed
by an accidental fire. And it is
which notice of loss was to be
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given, but the Court held there was
contract and will then be governed
no special contract, the plaintiff thereby."
In Southern Express
not having signed any document or
Co.v. Newby (x867), 36 Ga. 635, it
paper, the receipt being a mere
was held under this section, that a.
notice which would not limit the
receipt stipulating for exemption
carrier's liability.
from liability and limiting the
[In the DistriclofColumbia, the amount to be recovered to a certain
carrier is held liable for the actual
amountper package, unless the real
value of the goods, for in Gall v.
value be named at the time of shipAdams Express Company (1879),
ment, was not a special contract
MeArthur & Mackey (S. Ct. D. C.)
within the section, and the company
124, JAMES, J., says: "We hold were therefore liable for the full
* * that the principle of law
value. To the same effect, Purcell
which for considerations of public v. Southern Express Co. (I866), 34.
welfare forbids a common carrier to
Id. 515.
bargain in particular cases for com[In Illinois, there would seem to
plete exemption from responsibility be some conflict of opinion upon
for a violation of his duties, forbids
the question. The Western Transhim to impair his obligations to the portation Co. v. .Vewhall, et al.
community by bargaining in par(186o), 24 Ill. 466, was a case where
ticular cases for an exemption from
there were certain qualifications
a considerable part of that responand conditions on the back of the
sibility. The ground on which the receipt, which the company conrule is based, that even the ship- tended formed a part of its contract,
per's perfect consent can notwholly
and there the Court say, "We berelieve the carrier, is, that the oblieve the rule to be now well settled,
ject which he undertakes to reguthat the common law liability of a
late by contract is not his own but
common carrier cannot be so rea public right. * * The princi-. stricted, for notwithstanding the
ple of the rule is that an agreement
notice, the owner has a right to inwhich operates to interfere with the sist that the carrier shall receive
public right touching the care and. and carry the goods, subject to all
good faith of common carriers, is the incidents of his employment,
an agreement against public policy
and there can be no presumption
and welfare, and is, therefore, void; when they are delivered to, and reand as an agreement that his negli- ceived by, the carrier, that the
gence shall be cheap must operate owner intended to abandon any of
in this way, it necessarily falls
his legal rights, or yield to the
within that principle." In this
wishes of the carrier. * * A corncase the carrier's liability was mon carrier being regarded as an
limited to fifty dollars unless speinsurer of the goods, and accountcially insured, and specified in the able for any damage orloss that may
receipt.
happen to them in the course of the
[The Code of Georgia provides,
conveyance, unless arising from
"
2068, a common carrier cannot
the act of God or the public enemy,
limit his legal liability by any notice
it is not deemed salutary policy,
given, either by publication or by
that he shall escape this liability,
entry on receipts given on tickets by such general notices as we are
sold. He may make an express
considering. He may qualify his.
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liability by a general notice to all
-who may employ him, of any reasonable requisition to be observed
on their part in regard to the manX er of delivery and entry of parcels,
and the information to be given to
him of their contents, the rates of
freight and the like ; as for example,
that he will not be responsible for
goods above the value of a certain
sum unless they are entered as such,
and paid for accordingly." Later
cases would, however, seem to conflict with this opinion.
In 4dams Express Company v.
Slellaners (1871), 61 Ill. 184, goods
-were shipped from Chicago to New
York, worth in fact $4oo,for which
the company gave a receipt, limiting its liability to $5o, in case of
loss, of which the shipper had
-otice. The Court held that "even
if it should be conceded that the
shipper in this case must be considered as having assented to the
terms of the bill of lading, we cannot hold the carrier excused from
the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care. Courts have often had
occasion to express their regret that
common carriers have been per-mitted, even by contract, to discharge themselves from the obligations imposed by the salutary rules
<of
the common law. It is very un-easonable in the carrier to say that
it will, in no event, be liable beyond
the sum of $5o in the absence of a
special contract, though it may
have received much more than that
sum merely in the way of freight.
If common carriers desire to deal
fairly with the public, it would be
-very easy for them to require the
shipper to specify the value of the
merchandise and insert the amount
in the receipt, making their charges
in proportion to their liability. If
the shipper should falsely state the

value he could not complain at being held to his own valuation. In
order to prevent the carrier from
releasing himself, by contract, from
all liability, courts have laid down
the rule above stated that he cannot
even by contract, exempt himself
from the exercise of reasonable
care."
[In Oppenheimer &Co.v. U.S.Express Co. (1873),69 Ill. 62, Mr.Justice
SHELDON in delivering the opinion
of the Court, said: "A distinction
exists between the effect of these
notices by a carrier which seek to
discharge him from duties which
the law has annexed to his employment, and those, like the one in
question, designed simply to insure
good faith and fair dealing on the
part of his employer-in the former
case notice alone not being effectual,
without an assent to the attempted
restriction ; while in the latter case,
notice alone, if brought home to the
knowledge of the owner of the property delivered for carriage, will be
sufficient. * * Thecommon carrier is liable, as we find it frequently
laid down, in respect to his reward,
and the compensation should be in
proportion to the risk. As the common carrier incurs a heavy responsibility, he has a right to demand
from the employer, such information as -will enable him to decide
on the proper amount of compensation for his services and risk, and
the degree of care which he ought
to bestow in discharging his trust.
And such a limitation of the carrier's liability as the one in question
is held to be reasonable and consistent with public policy. But independent of the qualifying provision contained in the receipt, we
should be inclined to sustain the
defendant's claim of exemption
from liability on the ground of a

PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. V. WEILLER.

want of good faith in not disclosing
the value of the goods."
[The question was again raised
in Boscowitz et al. v. The Adams
Express Co. (1879), 93 IlL. 523,
where the printed conditions on the
receipt limited the carrier's liability
to $5o, "unless the just and true
value" of the goods "is herein
stated," and here the Court remarked, "It is .a proposition so
plain it will not be controverted,
that defendant can claim no exemption from liability for the loss of
the goods as a common carrier,
except such as given by express
contract. Neither in the written
nor printed part of the receipt is
there any express contract, making exemptions in favor of the defendant company. * * But admitting the conditions in the receipt were understandingly assented to by the shippers and became a
binding contract between the
parties, still defendant would be
liable for the full value ofthe goods
if the loss was owing to negligence
on the part of the railroad company."
In this case, SnErLION,
J., delivered a dissenting opinion,
following the lines taken by him
in Oppenheimer &" Co. v. U. S.
Express Co., sup ra.] In the recent
case of Chicago & Nr W. Ry. Co.
v. Chapman, decided May 14,1890,
the Supreme Court say: "We are
not unmindful that a contrary rule
has been announced by courts of
the highest respectability, and
among them the Supreme Court of
the United States. Notwithstanding the great respect we entertain
for the very learned and eminent
tribunals which have thus held, we
are so strongly committed to the
doctrine before announced that we
feel compelled to adhere to the rule
so long and firmly established in

this State. And notwithstanding
the persuasive weight of the rulings of these eminent tribunals,
and of the reasons given for their
decisions, we are still satisfied that
the rule laid down in this State is
based upon sound reason and a wise
public policy, and is also supported
by the decided weight ofauthority."
The rule followed is stated to be
that the carrier " may not exempt
himself from liability for damages
resulting from the gross negligence
or wilful misconduct of himself or
his servants," and this rule is held
to apply to a stipulation as to
value.
[In Indiana the question was
raised in the case of Rosenfeld v.
The Peoiia, D. & E. RR. Co.
(1885), O3 Ind. 21, where blanl-s.
in the bill of lading were filled up
with characters almost illegible,
but which on being interpreted
meant "ILeaks and outs excepted,
$2o railroad valuation." This was
followed by a statement thus, "in
the event of loss or damage under
the provisions of this agreement,
the value or cost at the point of
shipment shall govern the settlement of the same." The company
contended that its liability was
limited to $20. In the opinion of
the Court it is said: "If they may
contract against all liability for
loss by means other than their own
negligence or fraud, of course they
may contract for the amount of recovery in such cases. But in case
of a loss through their negligence
or fraud, the same reasons, at first
view, would seem to exist against
contracts limiting the amount of recovery as exist against contracts for
total exemption. * * If without
any representation of value by the
shipper, or a request of him for a
statement of value, and without no-
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tice and contract, and a valuable consideration, the carrier should place
a value upon the articles received
for carriage, that would not bind
the shipper. In such case, hewould
clearly have the right to recover
the full value of the articles lost by
the carrier. If, on the other hand,
for the purpose of getting reduced
rates, the shipper should place a
value upon the articles for carriage,
o r if by any kind of artifice he
should induce the carrier to place a
lower value upon the articles, and
thus get seduced rates, it seems to
be settled by the-weight of authority
that he could not recover beyond
the value so fixed by him, or the
value which by deceithe caused the
carrier to fix. * * That carriers
may, by fixing value, limit this
common law liability, it must be
shown that the shipper had some
kind of knowledge of such fixing
of value, and for a sufficient consideration consented thereto, or that
his statements or conduct justified
the carrier in so fixing the value."
The Adams Express Co. v. Harris,
et al.(1889), 120 Ind. 73 to the same
effect.
[The public laws of rowa relating to Railroads (Rev. Stat. 1888),
provide: "2007, No contract, receipt, rule, or regulation, shall exempt any corporation engaged
in transporting persons or property
by railway from liability of a common carrier, or carrier of passengers, which would exist had no
contract, receipt, rule, or regulation, been made or entered into."
By section 3371, the above provision is applied to. warehousemen
and common carriers. The case of
Hartv. The Chicago &. N. W. Ry.
Co. (1886), 69 Iowa 485, was decided under this clause, the contract
of carriage limiting the company's
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liability to one hundred dollars per
horse.
RED, J., there says:
"Whether a common carrier, in
the absence of any statute restricting his powers in that respect, can,
by rule, regulation or contract,
limit his liability for the property
received by him for carriage, has
been the subject of much discussion, and there is great conflict in
the decision of the courts on the
question. We have no occasion,
however, in this case, to enter into
that question. No one would question that in the absence of a contract limiting the amount of his
liability, the shipper would be entitled, in case of the destruction or
injury of the property under such
circumstances as that the carrier
was liable for the loss, to recover
full compensation for injuries sustained. The statute quoted above
prohibits the making of any contract that would exempt him from
the liability of a common carrier
which would exist if no contract,
rule or regulation existed. If the
statute is applicable to a contract
in which the understanding is to
transport the property from this
State into another State or territory
of the United States, it cannot be
doubted, we think, that the provision of the contract in question, by
which it was sought to limit the
liability of defendant for the horses
to an amount less than the actual
value of the property, is repugnant
to its provisions, and consequently
invalid."
To the same effect,
AfeCne v. The B., C R. &. N. R.
Co. (1879), 52 Iowa 6oo.
In Kansas, the carrier is held responsible for the actual value of
goods lost by his own negligence:
Xansas Czty, S.J. &' C. B. RR. Co.
v. Simison (I883), 3o Kan. 645. The
Court adopts in this case the rea-
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soning of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia in Gall v.
Adams Express Co., supra, and
adds, "While the provision in a
bill of lading or contract between
the shipper and the carrier, thatthe
latter will not be liable beyond a
certain sum expressed in the contract, may be valid to limit the liability of the carrier as an insurer,
a condition of this character which
seeks to cover the negligence of the
carrier is void."
In Kentucky, the same rule has
been followed: Orndorffv. Adams
Express Co. (1867), 3 Bush. (Ky.)
'94.
[In Little et al v. Boston
Maine RR. (1876), 66 Me. 239,
the Court say: "When the article
is of an extraordinary or unusual
value the carrier would -well be entitled to a higher rate of compensation, inasmuch as he might be
reasonably held to a greater degree
of care. * * It seems that common carriers may limit their liability by notice brought home to
the owner ot goods before, or at
the time of their delivery, and expressly or impliedly assented to
by him."
[The case Breime v. Adams
Express Co. (1866), 25 Md. 328,
shows that in that State a carrier
may by special contract limit the
amount of his liability, for there
the Court said, "The receipt executed by the appellee [the company] and accepted by the appellant, constituted the contract between the parties and both upon
reason and authority, they are
bound by its terms. The contents
and value of the parcel were not
disclosed to the appellee, anditwas
expressly agreed that its value was
fifty dollars. Like in a valued
policy of insurance, to which the
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contract in question is analogous,
the amount of risk assumed by the
appellee was fixed by the agreement, and must, in case of loss, be
the measure of the appellant's recovery."
In Massackusetts, the rule is in
direct accordance with that established by the United States Supreme
Court: Squire v. New York CentralRR. Co. (1867), 98 Mass. 239;
Graves v. Lake Shore & Af. S.
RR. Co. (1884), 137 Id. 33. In the
latter case the Court (MORTON, C.
J.) say: "The plaintiffs voluntarily entered into the contract with
the defendant; no advantage was
taken of them; they deliberately
represented the value of the goods
[high wines] to be $2o per barrel.
The compensation for carriage was
fixed upon this value; the defendant is injured and the plaintiffs are
benefited by this valuation, if it can
now be denied. The plaintiffs cannot recover a larger sum without
violating their own agreement. Although one of the indirect effects
of such a contract is to limit the
extent of the responsibility of the
carrier for the negligence of his
servants, this was not the purpose
of the contract. We cannot see that
any considerations of a sound public policy require that such contracts should be held invalid, or
that a person who in such contract
fixes a value upon his goods which
he entrusts to the carrier, should
not be bound by his valuation."
These cases were expressly affirmed
in Hill v. Boston, H. 7. & W.
RR. Co. (1887), i44 Mass. 284.
[In Mickigan, the Revised Statutes (ed. 1882, pages 843, 879), provide: " 3328, Any railroad company organized under this act, receiving freight for transportation,
shall be entitled to the rights and
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be subject to the liabilities of common carriers, except, as herein
otherwise provided; but no company shall be suffered to lessen or
abridge its common law liability as
a common carrier, unless by an
agreement to be signed by both
parties thereto."
" 3418. Thatno railroad company shall be permitted to change
its common law liability as a common carrier, by any contract, or in
any other manner, except by a
written contract, none of which
shall be printed, which shaU be
signed by the owner or shipper of
the goods or property to be carried."
This last provision is contained in
ch. 92, of Howell's Annotated
Statutes (ed. 1882, page 879), and
from its heading would seem to apply to Railroad Companies in general, and not like the previous section to those organized under the
Statute therein referred to. The
section is headed "Liability of
Railroad Companies as Common
Carriers."
The Minnesota Supreme Court
is apparently in accord with the
principal case, intimating, however, that an agreement made in
good faith to liquidate the damages
recoverable in case of loss through
the carrier's negligence, would be
enforced. In Mifoulton v. St. Paitd,
A. &. f. Ry. Co. (1883), 31 Minn.
85, that Court said: "The same
reasons which forbid that a common carrier should, even by express contract, be absolved from
liability for his own negligence,
stand also in the way of any arbitrary preadjustment of the measure
of damages, where the carrier is
partiallyrelieved from such liability. It would indeed be absurd to
say that the requirement of the law
as to such responsibility of the car-

rier is absolute, and cannot be laid
aside, even by the agreement of the
parties, but that one-half or threefourths of this burden, which the
law compels the carrier to bear,
may be laid aside, by means of a
contract limiting the recovery of'
damages to one-half or one-fourth
of the known value of the property.
This would be mere evasion, which
would not be tolerated. Yet there
is no reason why the contracting
parties may not, in good faith,
agree upon the value of the property presented for transportation,
or fairly liquidate the damages
recoverable in accordance with the
supposed value. Such an agreement would not be an abrogation
of the requirements of the law, but
only the application of the law as
it is, by the parties themselves, to
the circumstances of the particular
case. But that the requirements
of the law be not evaded, and its.
purposes frustrated, contracts of
this kind should be closely scrutinized."
[In this case, the general regulation attached to the contract, provided that the company should not
be liable beyond one hundred dollars per head on horses and valuable live-stock, except by special
agreement. This clause, the Court
stated, "is plainly opposed to the
law as established, so far as regards
the negligence of the carrier. As
a regulation, it is, therefore, of no,
effect. The law declares that the
carrier shall be liable to the full extent of the value of the property,
although there be no special agreement."
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has recently passed upon the
question under consideration, taking its stand in direct accordance
with the doctrine of the principal
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case: Southern Express Co. v.
Seide, S. Ct. Miss., June 2, 1890.
The Court say in this case: "Stipulations in contracts with common
carriers of similar import with that
under consideration have frequently
been presented to the Courts fordecision, and it is very generally
held that their effect is to exempt
the carrier from a greater responsibility, only when the loss occurs
without the negligence or fault of
the carrier; but where the loss
springs from negligence, -the full
value may be recovered, notwithstanding the stipulation."
To the
same effect are the earlier cases of

supra, M3foullon v. St. Paul Il. &

.3. Ry. Co., supra, and U. S. Express Co. v. Backman, ifra,
remarks: "even under the rule declared in the former [Hart v.
Pennsylvania] class of decisions,
these provisions thus employed
and resorted to by common carriers to restrict their liability,
are to be tested by their fairness, justice and reasonableness.
The reduced rate, if such it
was, was the consideration for the
exemption from liability beyond.
the one hundred dollars, even in
case of injury and loss from the defendant's negligence." In distinSouthern Express Co. v. 'IMoon guishing the case from Hart v.
(1863), 39 Miss. 822, and Clhicago, Pennsylvania RR., he says: "In
St. L. & JV. 0. RR. Co. v. Abels [that case] *
the discussion
(1883), 6o Id. 1017.
was had upon the terms of the bill
In Mlissouri, the question under
of lading alone, and as the Court
discussion was considered in Har- say, 'without any evidence upon
vey v. Terre Haute 6- I. RR. the subject, and especially in the
Co. (I88i), 74 Mlo. 538, where the absence of evidence to the conCourt said: "We do not regard a trary,' and under the qualifications
a contract limiting a right of recov- it contains, we cannot regard it as
ery to a sum expressly agreed upon
controlling authority in a case
by the parties as representing the
where the evidence clearly shows
true value of the property shipped,
absence of reduced or lower rate,
as a contract in any degree exemptor any graduation of compensaing the carrier from the consequention to the valuation. On the one
ces of its own negligence. Such a
hand it may be, as is there said, uncontract fairly entered into, leaves just, unreasonable, and repugnant
the carrier responsible for its neg- to sound principles of fair dealing,
ligence, and simply fixes therateof
for the shipper to reap the benefits
freight and liquidates the damages.
of a contract, by which he secures
a lower rate than the carrier might
This we think it is competent for
reasonably charge for the service
the carrier to do."
[In the more recent case of 1fIcrendered, if there be no loss, and
Fadden v. The Missouri Pacific to repudiate it in case of loss.
Ry. Co. (1887), 92 Mo. 343, the bill Where the shipper procures the
of lading stipulafed that the defend- lawful rates of the carrier to be reant should not be liable for more
duced in express consideration of
than one hundred dollars per head the agreed value, upon which the
for the mules, which were carried
compensation is based, he is, under
at a reduced rate. Here RAY, J.,
numerous authorities, -- - held
after commenting upon and examto be estopped to say the value is
ining Hart v. Pennsylvania RR., greater when the loss occurs. On
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the other hand, it would, we think,
be no less unfair, unreasonable and
unjust that the carrier, without any
sacrifice of his interests, or lawful
demands, or diminution of his lawful charges, should secure, without
any consideration therefor, such
important advantages and release
of liability to which he would
otherwise be subjected under the
law. "I
[The Compiled Statutes of Nebraska (ed. 1889) provide-" Sec.
iii. Any railroad company receiving freight for transportation shall
be entitled to the same rights and
be subject to the same liabilities as
common carriers. And whenever
two or more railroads are connected together, the company owning either of said roads receiving
freight to be transported to any
place on the line of either of the
roads so connected shall be liable
as common carriers for the delivery of such freight to the consignee of said freight, in the same
order in which such freight was
shipped."
[Ch. 72, Id. page 628, provides,
"SEc. 5, No notice either express
or implied, shall be held to limit
the liabilities of any railroad company as common carriers, unless
they shall make it appear, that such
limitation was actually brought to
the knowledge of the opposite
party and assented to by him or
them, in express terms, before such
limitation shall take effect."
[In Article XI. of the Constitution of this State it is provided,
inter alia, by SEC. 4, "The liability of railroad corporations as
common carriers, shall never be
limited." In The Atchison C_ Nebraska RR. Co. v. Washburn &
Leihy (1876), 5 Neb. 17, the Court
held an agreement limiting the car-
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rier's liability to be "in violation
of law and against public policy,"
and could "not lessen the plaintiff's responsibility as common carrier, nor remove its liability for
negligence of its servants."
[Two cases have very recently
been decided in the Supreme Court'
of New Hampshireupon this question, Duntley v. Boston & M. RR.,
July 26, I89O; and Durgin v. American-Express Co., July 25, 1890;
they follow the rule as laid down in
Hart v. Pennsylvania RR. Co.,,
subra.
[In New Jersey, the rule as laid
down in Hart v. PennsylvaniaRR..
Co., supra,is followed: TheLydian
1onarch (1885), D. Ct., D. N. J.,
23 Fed. Repr. 298.
[The question was raised in New
York, in the case of 11agnin el al.
v. Dinsmore (1874), 56 N. Y. r68,
where the receipt contained, inter
alia,the following clause: "It is
further agreed, and is part of the
consideration of this contract, that
the Adams Express Company are
not to be held liable or responsihle
for the property herein mentioned
for any loss or damage arising from
the dangers of railroad, ocean,
steam, orriver navigation, leakage,
fire, or from any cause whatever,
unless specially insured by them
and so specified in this receipt;
which insurance shall constitute
the limit of the liability of the
Adams Express Company in any
event; and if the value of the property above described is not stated
by the shipper, the holder hereof
will not demand of the Adams Express Company a sum exceeding
fifty dollars for the loss or detention. of, or damage to the property
aforesaid." JoHsoN, J., who delivered the opinion of the Court,
said; "The first question which

PENNSYLVANIA

RAILROAD CO. V. WEILLER.

arises in'this case is as to the meaning of the contract under which
the plaintiffs claim to recover
against the defendants; for it is no
longer open to question, in this
State, that in the absence of fraud
or imposition, the rights of carrier
and shipper are controlled by contract, in writing, delivered to the
shipper by the carrier, at the time
of the receipt of property for transportation." But in concluding he
adds, "The terms ofthese contracts
are very much under the control of
the carriers, and they may justly
be required to express in plain
terms the entire exemption for
which they stipulate. * * If it
be desired to cover losses by negligence, it is not too much to say
that the purpose must be clearly
expressed."
The next case in
which this question was raised, was
Steers v. The Liverpool, lw York
and Philadelphiia Sleamship Co.
(i874), 57 Id. i, which directly followed the ruling of the Court in
Belger v. Dinsmore, infra. In
Westcott et al. v. Fargo, President,
etc. (i875), 61 Id. 542, the Court referring to the cases above mentioned, said: "This point must now be
regarded as settled by recent decisions in this Court [The Commission of Appeals] and in the Court
of Appeals. The result of these
cases is, that it is lawful for a carrier to make such a contract as was
entered into in the present case,
exempting him from liability and
that he may, by clear and distinct
expressions, relieve himself from
losses occasioned by his own negligence. On the otherhand, general
words, 'such as that he will not be
liable for loss, or detention, or
damage,' are not to be construed to
extend to losses, etc., occasioned
by negligence."] In Magnin v.

Dinsmore(1877), 70 Id. 41o, ALLiEN,
J., says: "The act which will deprive of the benefit of a contract
for a limited liability fairly made,
must be an affirmative act of wrong
doing, not merely ordinary neglect
in the course of the bailment. It
need not necessarily be intentional
wrong doing, but the mere omission of ordinary care in the safe
keeping and carriage of the goods
is not the misfeasance intended by
the authorities."
[To the same effect is the earlier
case of Belger v. Dinsmore (I872),
51 Id. i66, where the receipt given
limited the defendant's liability to
fifty dollars unless otherwise expressed, and the Court held that
"a party accepting such an instrument * * declares his assent by
such acceptance, to those terms
and conditions."
[in North Carolina, the rule is
established that a common carrier
being an insurer against all losses
and damages, except those occurring from the act of God or the
public enemy, may* by special
notice brought to the knowledge of
the owner of goods delivered for
transportation, or by contract, restrict his liability as an insurer,
where there is no negligence on
his part. He cannot by contract
even limit his responsibility for loss
or damage resulting from his want
of the due exercise ot ordinary
care. A contract restricting the
liability of the carrier must be
reasonable, and not calculated to
ensnare or defraud the other party.
Capehart v. Seaboard & Roanoke
RR. Co. (1879), Si N. C. 438. Here
the bill of lading stipulated that in
case of any claim for damages to
the articles mentioned therein, the
extent of such damage should be
adjusted before the removal from
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the station, and claim therefor
made in thirty days, and the Court
held it unreasonable. In every
case, the restriction must be brought
to the knowledge of the consignor,
and a restriction in a bill of lading
given at the time of the delivery of
the goods, and received by the shipper without remonstrance or obo jection, is equivalent to an express
contract: Whitehead v. Wilinington & Weldon RR. Co., 87 N. C.
255. In Weinberg v. Albemarle
& Raleigh RR. Co. (1884), 91 Id.
31, the Court said, "the bill of lading was evidence of a contract between the plaintiff and defendant,
and the former is bound by all the
stipulations therein that were lawful and did not contravene public
policy in respect to common carriers."
The Ohio Supreme Court is in
full accord with the Pennsylvania
cases. The question under consideration arose in U. S. Exfpress Co.
v. Backman (1875), 28 Ohio St.
144, where the Court said: "The
Ohio cases hbreinbefore cited make
it clear that common carriers cannot, by contract, exempt themselves from liability for full damages
for a loss occasioned by their own
negligence or that of their servants.
No more can they legally stipulate
.for a partial exemption from liability caused by like negligence.
The public policy that avoids a
contract for total exemption, will
hold a contract void that provides
for partial exemption in such case.
The fact that by reason ofsuch contract the carrier undertook the
transportation of the goods for a diminished reward will avail him
nothing."
[The General Statutes (ed. 1882,
p. 389) of South Carolina provide
-"
Snc. 1333. No public notice
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or declaration shall limit or in any
wise affect the liability at common
law of any public common carriers
for or in iespect of any goods to be
carried and conveyed by them; but
they shall be liable, as at common
law, to answer for the loss of or injury to any articles and goods delivered to them for transportation,
any public notice or declaration by
them made and given contrary
thereto or in anywiselimiting such
liability notwithstanding." Under
this section the case of Piedmont
.l'anzfacuring Couizany v. Columbia & GreenvilleRR. Co. (I882)
19 S. C. 353, held "that common
carriers in this State cannot limit
their common law responsibilityby
any * * special contract for or
in respect of any goods to be carried by them."
In Tennessee, the question of the
effect of- contracts containing a
stipulated valuation hds recently
been elaborately considered in the
case of Louisville &_N. RR. Co. v.
Wynne, S. Ct. Tenn., Jan. 2, i89o.
After stating the general rule that
" common carriers may limit their
liability by special contract, provided afways, that such limitation shall
not operate to exempt them from the
consequences of their own negligence, or that of their servants,"
the opinion of the Court in this
case goes on to say : " Is the limitation in the contract before us
within the prohibition of this
eminently just and generally accepted principle? Manifestly the
stipulation does not contemplate
total exemption from liability;
it only provides for partial or
limited exemption. Upon that distinction, the nice and important
question arises, can a stipulation of
the latter character stand before the'
law ,when one of the former kind
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-cannot? Or, to state the same
question differently, and so as to
apply it more directly to the facts
of this case, the rule of law being
established, as we have seen it is,
that the defendant company could
not lawfully have contracted with
the plaintiff that it would in no
event be liable for any part of the
value of the mare, if lost or destroyed, can the limitation of its
liability to $ioo be upheld in the
courts, if it should appear that her
death resulted from the negligence
of the company, and that she was
in fact worth eight times that
amount, as thejury found her to be ?
We unhesitatingly answer, 'No.'
The carrier cannot by contract ex-cuse itself from liability for the
whole nor any part of a loss
brought about by its negligence.
To our minds it is perfectly clear
that the two kinds of stipulation
-that providing for total, and that
providing for partial, exemption
from liability for the consequences
of the carrier's negligence-stand
upon the same ground, and mustbe
tested by the same principles. If
one can be enforced, the other can ;
if either be invalid, both must be
held to be so, the same considerations of public policy operating in
each case. With great deference
for those who may differ with us,
we think it entirely illogical and
unreasonable to say, that the carrier may not absolve itself from
liability for the whole value of
property lost or destroyed through
its negligence, but that it may absolve itself from responsibility
for one-half, three-fourths, seveneighths, nine-tenths, or ninetyhundredths of the loss so occasioned. With great unanimity the authorities say that it cannot do the former. If allowed to do the latter, it
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may thereby substantially evade
and nullify the law, which says it
shall not do the former, and in that
way do indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly. We holdthat it
can do neither. The requirement
of the law has ever been, and is
now, that the common carrier shall
be diligent and careful in the transportation of its freight, and public
policy forbids that it shall throw off
that obligation by stipulation for
exemption in whole or in part from
the consequences of its negligent
acts. This view is sustained by
sound reason, and also by the
weight of authority." The Court
attempts, however, in a subsequent
portion of the opinion, to distinguish this case from Hart v. Pennsylvania RR.Co. (IS 4 ), 112 U. S.
331, for the.reason that in the latter
case "there was an agreed valuation
stated in the contract as the basis
of the carrier's charges and responsibility, and the Court very properly held that in such cases, the
shipper was estopped to claim
a greater sum than the agreed
valuation. Though evident from
the reasoning in the body of the
opinion in the Hart Case, which
may now be called the leading case
in America, the Court is careful to
say, in conclusion, that the decision
is based alone upon the ground
above stated." The stipulation in
the Tennessee case -wasas follows:
"And it is further agreed that
should damage occur for which
[the carrier] may be liable, the
value at the place and date of
shipment shall govern the settlement, in which the amount claimed shall not exceed" a specified
sum. The distinction appears to
be drawn from the fact that no
abatement of freight charges was
made in consideration of this stip-
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ulation, and the Court intimates
that, had such been the case, it
would have followed the ruling in
the Hart Case. Such a course
would, however, seem inconsistent
with the reasoning just quoted.
The Tennessee Supreme Court
expressed the same view of the law
in Coward v. East Tennessee, V.
&. G. RR.Co. (i886), I6Lea 225.
[In Texas, the Civil Statutes
(vol. i, ed. 1888) provide: "ART.
278, Railroad companies and other
common carriers of goods, wares
and merchandise, for hire, within
this State, on land, or in boats or
vessels on the waters entirely
within the body of this State, shall
not limit or restrict their liability
as it exists at common law, by any
general or special notice, or by inserting exceptions in the bill of lading or memorandum given upon
tie receipt of the goods for transportation, or in any other manner
whatever, and no special agreement made in contravention of the
foregoing provisions of this article
shall be valid." In the case of A1.
P. Ry. Co. v. Barnes & Co. (1885),
2 Texas App. C. C. 507, the bill of lad'ing stipulated that in the event ofthe
loss of the property, "the value or
cost of the same at the point of
shipment" should govern the settlement, and the Court gave judgment for the market value of the
goods, which was greater than the
cost of the same.
[In Vermont, it would seem that
the carrier may by an express contract limit his liability. '"The express contract," says RlDFIELD, J.,
"Iought, perhaps, to be very clearly
proved, and in water carriage is
usually required to appear in the
bill of lading. But a mere general
notice, when brought to the knowledge of the owner, ought not, per-

haps, to have that effect, unless
there is, very clear proof, that the
owner expressly assented to that, as
forming the basis of the contract :"
Farmers &' Mechanics' Bank v.
Clam!lin Transporlation Co.
(1851), 23 Vt. i86. To the same
effect, 3fann el al.v. Bichardetal.
(1S67), 40 Id. 326.
[The question of the right of a
common carrier to limit his liability
is provided for by the Code of Virginia which provides: "SEc; 1296,
No agreement made by a common
carrier for exemption from liability
for injury or loss occasioned by his
own neglect or misconduct, shall
be valid." The case of Virginia
and Tennessee RR. Co. (I875), 26
Gratt. (Va.) 328, further supports
the doctrine that a common carrier
cannot by express contract relieve
himself from liability in any degree from want of care or faithfulness in himself or his agents.
[In Richnond & Danville R.
Co. v. Payne, decided in the Snpreme Court of Appeals of Va.,
o
o
January 3 , 189 , there was a special contract in the bill ofladingfor
the carriage of horses at a reduced
rate, and the amount to be claimed
in case of loss was limited to one
The
hundred dollars a horse.
Court said: "There is no doubt
that a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from
liability for the consequences of his.
own negligence or that of his servants. * * But that is not the
question before us. The question
here is whether, when a shipper
sig-ns a bill of lading, not exempting the carrier from liability for
the negligence of himself or hi&
servants, but limiting the amount
in which the carrier shall be liable,
in consideration of the goods being
carried at reduced rates, such a con-
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tract, fairly entered into, is valid
and binding; and we see no reason
why, when its terms are just and
reasonable, it should not be. The
test to be applied in all such cases
is, Was the contract fairly entered
into, and are its terms just and
reasonable ?"
After examining
the authorities and especially Hart
v. Pennsylvania,supfra, the Court
continued: "This reasoning [Hart
v. Pennsylvania], which seems to
us sound, is supported by numerous decisions of courts of the highest respectability, and is decisive
of the present case."
In Wisconsin, it has been held
-that the carrier cannot by special
contract limit the amount of his
liability, except in case of loss
without fault upon his pait: Black
v. Goodrich Transiortation Co.
(1882) 55 Wis. 319.
The English case of M17anchester,
S. & L..Ry. Co. v. Brown (1883),
L. R. 8 App. Cases, 703, cited by
MITCHELL, J., in his dissenting
opinion, was upon the general question of the power ofa carrier to protect himself by special contract
from the results of hi. and his servants's negligence, and was decided under the Railway and Canal
'Traffic Act of 1854 (7 and 18 Vict.
c. 31, sect. 7), which provided that
"every such company shall be
liable for the loss of or for any injury done to any horses, cattle, or
other animals, or to any articles,
good% or things, in the receiving,
forwarding, or delivering thereof,
occasioned by the neglect or default of such company or its servants, notvithstanding any notice,
condition, or declaration made and
given by such company contrary
thereto, or in anywise limitingsuch
liability; every such notice, conditibn, or declaration being hereby
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declared to be null and void: Provided always, that nothing herein
contained shall be construed to prevent the said companies from making such conditions with respect to
the receiving, forwarding and delivering of any of the said animals,
articles, goods, or things, as shall
be adjudged by the Court or Judge
before whom any question relating
thereto shall be tried to be just and
reasonable.
* * *
Provided
also, that no special contract between such company and any other
parties respecting the receiving,
forwarding or delivering of any
animals, articles, goods, or things
as aforesaid shall be binding upon
or affect any such party unless the
same be signed by him, or by the
person delivering such animals,
articles, goods, or things respectively for carriage." In the opinion of Lord BLACKBURN, however,
the view is expressed that, irrespective of the Act, a carrier might by
special contract, if fair and reasonable, protect himself from the negligence of his servants (p. 709).
The Fnglish authorities on the general question are fully cited in this
case, and in Peek v. North StaffordshireRy. Co. (1863), io H. I,.
C. 473.
[In conclusion, it may be asked:
Shall an agreed valuation limit the
common law liability? and if so,
how far shall printed or other notice of the terms upon which the
carrier will transport the goods. be
considered as agreed to?
[The first question receives a
negative answer inColorado (777-8).
District of Columbia (779), Illinois
(779), Iowa (782) by Statute, Kansas (782), Kentucky (783), Mississippi (784-5), Nebraska (786). Ohio
(788), Pennsylvania (766, 771),
South Carolina (788), Tennessee

